According to the RAND think tank, the impasse of the conflict in Ukraine will directly threaten the interests of the United States –

The Rand Corporation, founded in 1948 by the American aircraft manufacturer Douglas, is today one of the most influential think tanks in the United States, especially on military and international affairs, especially not on politics, unlike other major American think tanks. connected. In fact, his analyzes are often scrutinized by both American policymakers and the Pentagon. Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Rand has produced a large number of often highly topical analyzes at a steady pace. A recent analysis published on January 27 deserves special attention. Indeed, apart from tactical, economic and political analyses, it studies the risk of the Ukrainian conflict becoming bogged down or spreading through a specific critical, namely the political, economic and strategic interests of the United States.

As we have already discussed in previous articles, the risk of the conflict stalling or even moving out of the Ukrainian theater has increased significantly in recent months, especially since Moscow has committed to changing its approach to this war. From purely tactical management with very dubious results at the beginning of the conflict to strategic management based on the Kremlin’s objective assets, namely its defense industry and demographic superiority. Rand’s analysis, “Avoiding a Long War – US Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” is indeed a methodical study of all the risks and expected outcomes of a likely stalemate in the conflict. , while now neither Moscow nor Kyiv can impose themselves militarily and permanently on their enemy.

According to Rand Corp. The risk of Russia using non-strategic nuclear weapons is not insignificant

First, the analysis studies all the parameters resulting from a possible deadlock of the conflict, with two main risks, which are the use of nuclear weapons, which are not excluded by American analysts, and the extension of the conflict to a confrontation between the two countries. NATO and Russia, again, are considered much more plausible by experts in the media than is generally accepted, even if a conventional direct confrontation between Russia and NATO would not favor the former. Three more analytical keys are also identified, namely the issue of territorial control for the two belligerents, the issue of prolonging the conflict over time, and finally, the various options for ending this conflict. Each of these criteria is then studied in terms of its implications for American interests. Without commenting on the open-access analysis, it is clear that the risks and limitations to the United States from this stalemate far outweigh the few potential benefits of continued conflict. the entire spectrum of analysis. In other words, the US is not interested in prolonging the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while it should prepare for a political, economic, and possibly military conflict with China.

According to the same analysis, there is no question of capitulating to Russia by reducing or canceling military support to Kiev, the consequences of such a decision are also to the detriment of Washington and its allies. To overcome this problem, the authors of the analysis recommend several approaches, the first of which is a radical change in the organization of military and strategic support in Kiev. Indeed, the methodology used so far by Washington and the entire Western bloc is based on consistent support to respond in short order to the needs expressed by the Ukrainian armies in order to counter the Russian armies. If this approach allowed the transfer of equipment to Ukraine from simple anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems at the beginning of the conflict to today’s heavy tanks and high-tech anti-aircraft and artillery systems, without causing any danger. Whatever the length of the conflict, it is now reaching its limits.

Since the beginning of the conflict, Washington’s support doctrine has allowed it to switch from supplying Javelin and Stinger missiles to Abrams heavy tanks, Bradley IFVs and Patriot anti-aircraft systems without causing tension between Russia and NATO. But this is now an obstacle to Russia’s new medium-term strategic approach.

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